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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the defendant's prior conviction for

aggravated robbery was properly admitted into evidence for the
purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness.
2.

Whether a juror who knew the victim's wife should

have been excused for cause, and if so, whether the defendant's
failure to object to that juror at trial waived his right to
raise the issue on appeal.

ii

3.

Whether the blood sample drawn from the defendant

and the results of the testing of that sample were properly
admitted into evidence# and if not# whether the defendant's
failure to object to the admission of that evidence at trial
waived his right to raise that issue on appeal.
4.

Whether expert opinion testimony regarding the speed

of the defendant's vehicle was properly admitted into evidence.
5.

Whether the defendant was denied effective

assistance of counsel at trial.

iii

I

I I IE STATE OF UTAH,
PIaInti £ f/Responac
v s»
r.RF.GOPY R A Y M O N D W I G H T ,

(Priority No. 2)

Defendant/Appellant.

Statement of the Case
defendant, Gregory Raymond Wight, was charged with

Section 76-5-207, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
The defendant was convicted of Automobile Homicide
third degree felony,

.esser

held June

:.he Second Judicial District Court,
County, State of Uta! |(I t h e H o n o r a b l e D o u g l a s I • ,

Cornaby, Judge, presiding.
Cornaby

July 8, 1986,

fi 6 y

i lllliii1 mi illi

the amount

The defendant was sentenced by

Ji u ige

enn of imprisonment not to exceed
Prison, and to pay restitution in

$5,315.00.
The defendant petitioned '

Third Judicial District

Court
Wight v. Gerald Cook, Civil

?~*2

*

September

the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, found that the defendant had
been denied his right to appeal by the failure of his attorney
to perfect the appeal, and that he should be resentenced in order
to afford him the opportunity to perfect his appeal, pursuant to
State v, Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1980).
The defendant was resentenced on October 6, 1987, to
the same sentence as had initially been entered.

The defendant

filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied on November 20,
1987, by the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby.

The defendant then

filed the appeal which is presently before the Court.
Statement of the Facts
At approximately 1:00 a.m., or shortly thereafter in
the early morning of November 17, 1985, Victor Mark Pearce was
driving home after a date, travelling northbound on Redwood Road,
a two lane highway in the south end of Davis County.
54)

(T. 23-24,

Some distance behind Pearce, and also travelling northbound,

was Reid Neilsen, a 61 year old lifetime truckdriver, headed home
after work in his private pickup truck.

(T. 24, 57-60) Pearce

was travelling at about 55 miles per hour.

(T. 25)

Pearce noticed a vehicle coming towards him at what he
estimated to be also around 55 miles per hour.

(T. 37)

This

vehicle drifted completely into Pearce's lane, swerved back into
its own lane, just barely missing a collision with Pearce's
vehicle, and then drifted back into the oncoming lane, colliding
head-on with Reid Neilsen's vehicle, killing Neilsen.
28-30, 177)

(T. 24-26,

Pearce looked into his rearview mirror and saw a

flash of light, and then noticed that both the headlights of Reid
2

Neilsen's vehicle and the tai 1 1 i ghts of the car wl li ch 1 lad nearly
struck him had vanished
11iii I-, , ti i M I i

HI

i11 i m i I I n

urned around and drove

I "i«" I

("

*ed.

Pearce, who had received EMT training, checked the
drivers.

Neilsen died within minutes.

Wight, was tl: :ie :I:i :i « i • n

The defendant, Gr egory R.

c: £ I: .1 I = c: 1:1 :II= i c < • 1 :i :i c :] e

i
l

, ; '5 76,

13 3, 144)
The accident wa

investigated by Utah Highway Patrol
i

officers, who determined * . * : - , ,
Neilsen's lane of trave

northbound)

def end«--<

:

'it the

: avelling about 71 miles per hour

just before impact

<9)

The defendant was extricated from his vehicle with
i iJiS ] ( J e i 'ill If

Lake City.
Bythewa^

11 f I j

(T

MM
id

,1 M

l

MI I

I

I W "

*

II

I

I H'i }inr;|, i f * 1

ii (\1 ) t '

lit di Highway Patrol Trooper Steve
- \tv scene of the collision, went to LDS
Df a ..i i a] coho] i c be \ rex age

Hospitr

the defendant's breath, placed him under arrest,

(I

l 34- -135)

He then directed Kathy Burns, a certified blood-draw technician,
lit) t a k e .ii h l u o d sample f r o m I lit> dt'Iein l a n l

blood sample was drawn at 3:30 a.m.

(T

li'i,

IMi)

(T. 146, 150)

Tlic sample was analyzed by Bruce Beck

toxicologist
r

,

with the State Health Laboratory, by means
found t

contain .20 percent alcoho]

weight
•r counsel

concerning his testing procedures, ,

) as w H

the body's absorption rate for alcohol under various
3

The

circumstances, the rate alcohol is eliminated from the
bloodstream, the amounts of beer a person would have to consume
to reach the .20 percent level quickly, or over a longer period
of time, and other factors, such as drinking on a full or empty
stomach, and the effects of blood loss and IV solutions on the
blood alcohol level.

(T. 294-304)

The bottom line was that an

adult male of the defendant's approximate size would have to
consume roughly 18 cans of 12 ounce beer over a period of seven
hours in order to reach a .20 percent level.

(T. 302)

The defendant and his friend, Rick Millen, each
confirmed that the defendant had in fact purchased and consumed
an extensive amount of alcohol over the course of the day and
evening before the accident.

(T. 71, 334-35, 359-60)

The

defendant's estimate was that he had consumed "at least 10 beers,
and possibly more" (T. 335).
Summary Of The Argument
1.

The defendant's prior conviction for aggravated

robbery was properly admitted into evidence for impeaching his
credibility as a witness.
2.

The trial was not rendered unfair due to any juror

bias, as none existed.
3.

The blood sample drawn from the defendant and the

result of the testing of that sample were properly admitted into
evidence.

4

4.

The expert opinion of the ^peed of the defendant's

vehicle was properly admitted, and was supported by the
defendant's own testimony.
5.

The defendant was not denied effective assistance

of counsel, but rather was represented by very able and very
effective counsel.
Argument
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHING HIS CREDIBILITY AS A
WITNESS.
The defendant claims that the denial of his pretrial
motion to exclude evidence of his prior bonviction for aggravated
robbery, a felony, denied him a fair trial.
j

The defendant was convicted of Aggravated robbery, a
felony, in 1977, sentenced to the Utah S^ate Prison on February
28, 1978, and paroled on March 11, 1980.

(R. 127, 128, T. 2-4)

The defendant, during direct examination at trial, chose to
briefly describe the circumstances. He said that he and another
person "stole money" because they "need [ed]M it.
Rule 609 of the

(T. 352)

Rules of Evidence provides that

evidence of a prior conviction may be admitted w[f]or the purpose
of attacking the credibility of a witness," only where the prior
crime:
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweights its

prejudicial effect to the defendant, or
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.1
In the present case, either or both of the alternatives
of Rule 609 would allow admission of the prior conviction.

Under

the first alternative, the aggravated robbery conviction was a
crime punishable by more than a year's imprisonment, and the
trial court did engage in a weighing process, balancing the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudice to the
defendant.

(T. 2-7)

Equally important is the fact that the trial court made
clear to the jury the very limited purpose for which evidence of
the prior conviction had been admitted.

Jury Instruction 31 told

the jury, regarding the prior conviction, that
... the fact of conviction is one that you
may take into consideration in weighing his
testimony and determining his credibility.
It must not be used for any other purpose,
and, particularly, you should bear in mind
that conviction of the defendant of a crime
at some previous time is no proof that he is
quilty of the offense with which he is now
charged. (R. 63.)
"I Rule 609 also requires that, for such evidence to be
admissible, it must have been no more than ten years
since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the
confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date
In the present case, the defendant's 1977 conviction was nine
years prior to the trial date of June 12, 1986, and his parole
from prison on the offense was just over six years prior to the
trial, so the ten-year rule is not in issue.

6

It is clearly recognized in Utdh that felonies, even
those not involving dishonest or false Statement, can be
probative of the veracity and credibility of a witness, including
a defendant.

That is why Rule 609(a) aljlows evidence of such.

(See also Section 78-24-9, which requires a witness to answer to
a prior felony conviction, and State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986), where the Supreme Court setfs out factors applicable
in the weighing process.)
Secondly, Rule 609 requires th^ Court to admit evidence
of prior convictions involving "dishonest or false statement,"
and allows no discretion or balancing by the Court in such an
instance.
The defendant's trial counsel iven conceded this to the
trial court while arguing the matter.

Counsel stated, "And

while I would be the first to admit thai such a crime would go to
a person's honesty and trustworthiness, I think under the
circumstances of this case where it has nothing to do with along
those lines, it would be far more prejudicial than probative.
(T. 2)
It is true, as defendant points out, that some of the
federal circuit courts have held that theft, burglary, and
attempted robbery do not, in their view| involve dishonesty or
false statement for purposes of Federal! Rule 609. However, the
weight of the authority across the country still clings to the
old fashioned idea that stealing is dishonest.

U.S. v. O'Conner,

635 F.2d 814 (C.A.N.M. 1980) (transportation of stolen goods

involves dishonesty and is admissible to impeach); State v,
Holtcamp, 614 SW2d 389 (Tenn. Cr. App.)(stealing involves
dishonesty and is admissible to impeach - prior shoplifting
conviction); Dodson v. State. 536 So.2d 878 (Fla. App. 1978)
(theft is universally regarded as reflecting on a person's
veracity); State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320 (Maine 1978). State
v. Bucklin, 304 NW2d 452 (Iowa 1981). Daniels v. State, 408 NE2d
1244 (Ind. 1980), People v. Malone, 397 NE2d 1377 (111.

1979),

and Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1978) (all holding
theft to be a crime of dishonesty and therefore admissible to
impeach).
Furthermore, jurisdictions who have faced the issue have
specifically held that robbery and aggravated robbery do involve
dishonesty and are therefore admissible to impeach the
credibility of a witness, including a defendant.

U.S. v.

Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049 (U.S. App. D.C. 1983) (five year old
armed robbery conviction involved dishonesty and was admissible
to impeach); State v. Day, 577 P.2d 878, appeal after new trial
617 P.2d 142, cert, den. 101 S. Ct. 163, 66 L. Ed.2d 77 (N.M.
1978) (robbery clearly involves theft, which is dishonest);
People v. Holman, 356 NE2d 1115 (111. App. 1976) (robbery, armed
or otherwise, is probative of veracity, and is properly admitted
to impeach a testifying defendant); and Alexander v. State, 611
P.2d 469 (Alaska 1980)(robbery is a crime of dishonesty and is
admissible to impeach a testifying defendant).
Most important, however, is the clearly stated position
of the Utah Supreme Court, that a prior conviction of "theft is

8

admissible since it obviously involves 'dishonesty.'"2

State

i

v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984).

Albo, Terry v. ZCMI, 605

P.2d 314, at 324 (Utah 1979)(fn. 36, "Any crime involving the
theft of another person's property is generally considered as
involving dishonesty.")

It would be ridiculous to suggest that

one who merely steals the property of another may have that fact
used to attack his credibility, but if he adds to the stealing
the element of force, threat, or violencje, his credibility will
be protected from attack by the law.
Clearly evidence of the defendant's prior conviction was
properly admitted by the Court at trial .J
POINT II
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN CONTINUING WITH THE
TRIAL AFTER DISCOVERING THAT ONE JUROR HAD
BEEN ACQUAINTED WITH THE DECEASED'S WIFE SOME
YEARS AGO.
I
The defendant contends that he should be granted a new
trial because it was discovered, after the opening statement of
the prosecutor, that a juror had at one time been acquainted with
the wife of the victim.
At request of defense counsel after the prosecutor's
opening statement, the Court asked if arty of the jurors knew the
deceased.

(T. 15)

The following dialogue occurred:

2 There is no question that the defendant's conduct in committing
the aggravated robbery involved a theft* As pointed out above,
his own testimony at trial was that he $nd his co-conspirator
••stole money" because they Hneed[ed] iti" (T. 352) Indeed, the
defendant's characterization of that crime to the jury was as if
it had been a mere theft, involving no Violence. No instruction,
testimony, or argument ever mentioned any violence, force,
threats, or use of weapons having been involved in that incident.
9

THE COURT: Does anybody know the person who
is deceased?
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: Yes. I don't know him
personally. I know his wife. I did not
connect any of this prior to his statement up
here, but I do know his wife, but I do not
know him personally.
THE COURT:

In what capacity?

JUROR LANE FAWCETT: Before they moved to
Centerville, they lived about a block and a
half from us.
THE COURT:

Closely associated with them?

JUROR LANE FAWCETT:
church.

No.

Just through the

THE COURT: Belonged to the same ward?
that what you are saying?
JUROR LANE FAWCETT:

Is

Yes.

THE COURT: You understand what I said
earlier about the obligation to be fair and
impartial jurors. The fact that you know the
deceased, would that have anything to do with
that?
JUROR LANE FAWCETT:
wouldn't.
THE COURT:

1.

It

You will be fair and impartial?

JUROR LANE FAWCETT:
THE COURT:

I don't know.

Okay.

Absolutely.
(T. 16, 17)

The defendant and his counsel were given an

opportunity to discuss whether or not they had any objections to
proceeding with the jury as impanelled, and thereupon chose, as a
matter of strategy, to proceed without objection to the jury
impanelled, and thereby waived any objection.
case of Wight v. Cook, pp 35-36, 48-50, 61-63.)

10

(Transcript in the

2.

Even had a proper and timely objection been made as

to the jury impanelled, it should not have been granted, as the
juror was not biased and could not have fceen dismissed for cause.
The proper test for determining whether a juror should be excused
for cause was stated by the Utah Supreme|Court in the case of
State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (1984):
A Juror who has formed "strong and deep
impressions which will close the mind against
the testimony that may be of feared in
opposition to them; which willjcombat the
testimony and resist its forcer1 should be
excused for cause.
j
Such was simply not the case in the present instance.
The mere fact that a juror is acquainted with a victim,
witness, or the defendant is not grounds for excusing that juror
and does not deny the defendant a fair t^ial.

State v. Clayton,

514 P.2d 720 (Ariz. 1973)(fact that jurot was acquainted with
murder victim and his family for many years as business people
was not cause to dismiss juror); State v. Baran, 474 P.2d 728
(Utah 1970)(fact that juror lived in samb neighborhood as
defendants estranged wife, was not cause to excuse juror); State
v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984)(fact that a juror went to high
school with detective on the case not catise for excusing juror) .
The case of State vs. Jones, 52 Utah Adv. Rep. 39
(1987), cited by the defense, is easily distinguishable from the
case at bar.

There, two jurors in a murder case were involved

and "stated that they knew members of [trhe victim's] family and
that their associations would effect theSir impartiality."
at 39.)

One of the jurors stated specifically that her

11

(Id.,

particular "association would make her evaluation of some of the
evidence difficult because she saw [the victim's sister] at work
every day," but "she 'hoped' she could base her decision in the
case solely on the evidence introduced at trial." (Id.)

The

other juror in Jones stated that her associations with family
"would have a definite effect" upon her decision in the case, and
that she had discussed the murder with the victim's father and
sister, had been to the viewing of deceased's body, and "would
expect the defendant to prove his innocence because of what she
knew about the case." (Id.)
The situation in the case at bar is not even close to
Jones.

The deceased's wife was not a witness and did not

testify.

She was not involved in the collision which took her

husband's life, nor was she present during the investigation.
The juror here did not have a close or even a current association
with the deceased's wife.

She did not even recognize that the

case involved a person she knew of until after hearing the
opening statement of the prosecutor.

The juror not only stated

that she would "absolutely" have no bias against the defendant,
but the verdict given underscored that assertion, as the jury
had ample evidence upon which to convict the defendant of a
second degree felony as charged, but instead convicted him of the
lesser included third degree felony.
POINT III
THE BLOOD SAMPLE DRAWN FROM THE DEFENDANT AND
THE RESULT OF THE TESTING OF THAT SAMPLE WERE
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.

12

The defendant asserts that the blood sample drawn from
his body and the result of testing perfdrmed on that sample
should not have been admitted into evidence.

He complains that

a) the defendant was not properly arrested at the time of the
blood draw because he was unconscious at; the time, b) the blood
was not drawn within two hours of the drjiving, and c) no
"foundation" existed for admission of th(e blood sample or test
result.
First, the defendant did not object to the admission of
the blood sample or to testimony as to tjhe results of testing of
that sample.

A failure to timely object} results in a waiver of

that objection.
Second, the blood sample was prfoperly drawn, properly
tested, and properly admitted into evidence, even had an
objection been made.
1.

The defendant claims that tfhe arrest by Trooper

Steve Bytheway did not comply with the litah statutes. The
defendant was properly arrested, and Ut^h Code Section 76-5207(6) gave the officer authority to haye the blood drawn with or
without the defendant's consent, as the officer had "reason to
believe that the victim may die."
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct.
1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court
upheld the actions of a police officer |n requiring a suspect to
submit to a blood test where the officeij had probable cause to
arrest the person for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Schmerber, like the defendant here, had been arrested at a
13

hospital while being treated for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident, and his blood was drawn at the hospital
under the direction of a police officer, over Schmerber's
refusal.

The Supreme Court held that no violation of Schmerber#s

constitutional rights had occurred, either under the due process
clause (384 US, at 759), the privilege against self-incrimination
(384 US, at 765), or the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures (384 US, at 772).
Furthermore, even had an arrest not been effected due to
the defendant's supposed unconsciousness,^ the officer still had
clear statutory authority to have the blood drawn.

Utah Code

Section 41-6-44.10, the "implied consent law," discusses the
authority of a police officer to direct the administration of
chemical tests for blood alcohol content when the officer has
grounds to believe the person was driving a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicants.

Subsection (3) provides that:

Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in
any other condition rendering him incapable
of refusal to submit to any chemical test or
tests is considered to not have withdrawn
the consent provided for in Subsection (1),
and the test or tests may be administered
whether the person has been arrested or not.

The defendant's brief alleges that the defendant was
unconscious at the time of the blood draw, but that allegation is
not supported by the record. Neither Trooper Bytheway, nor Kathy
Burns, nor the defendant were ever asked specifically about the
defendant being unconscious when the blood was drawn. That was
simply not in issue at trial.

14

The drawing of blood under such conditions has also
passed constitutional muster.

In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 US

432, 1 L. Ed.2d 448, 77 S. Ct. 408 (1957), the suspect had been
involved in an automobile accident in which other persons were
killed, and was taken unconscious to a hospital. When the smell
of alcohol was detected on the suspect's breath, a highway patrol
officer directed the drawing of a blood sample.

The Supreme

Court held that the blood draw from the iinconscious suspect
violated no constitutional rights.

j

The defendant cites this Court's decision in In the
Interest of I.,R.L., 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (C.A. 1987), where
blood was drawn from a suspect who was never arrested, even
though probable cause existed.
situation completely.

However, I.,R.L. is a different

There, the suspect was conscious and

lucid, and was capable of refusing submission to testing.

Under

those circumstances, where subsection (3) of 41-6-44.10 clearly
did not apply, the only way the police could have properly
administered a chemical test was to have arrested the suspect,
which they failed to do.
In the present case, the police conduct was proper
whichever of the two procedures is applicable.

In I.,R.L., the

police did not follow either procedure properly.
2.

The fact that the blood may not have been drawn

within two hours of the driving does not render the test results
inadmissible.

Utah Code Section 44-6-44.5(2) specifically states

that a test result is admissible even when the sample was taken

15

more than two hours after the driving.

The trier of fact simply

determines what weight to give the result of such a test.
3.

The defendant claims a lack of "foundation" for

admission of the blood sample and test results, but fails to
state specifically what is lacking.
Trial testimony established that the blood was drawn
from the defendant by Kathy Burns, a trained, experienced,
certified, blood-draw technician; she drew two tubes of blood
from Gregory Raymond Wight at LDS Hospital in the presence of
Trooper Steve Bytheway.

Kathy Burns testified that she

immediately numbered the two tubes, put them in a packet, sealed
the packet with tape, and watched as she had Trooper Bytheway
sign the seal, took the sealed packet to her home and placed it
in a locked container in the refrigerator, and kept it there
until the afternoon of November 21st, when she personally took it
to the state Health Lab and delivered it directly to Bruce Beck.
It was still sealed and had not been opened when she delivered it
to Bruce Beck. (T. 150-153.)

Bruce Beck testified that when he

received the packet directly from Kathy Burns on November 21st,
it was still sealed.

He stated that he immediately put his

laboratory number on the envelope with his initials, then placed
it in the refrigerator in a locked evidence room at the lab.
Later that same day, Bruce Beck, a trained, experienced
toxicologist, opened the packet, removed and two tubes of blood,
and performed an analysis for blood alcohol content, receiving a
result of 0.20 percent ethanol alcohol.
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He then replaced the

tubes into the envelope and resealed it with his own tape.

(T.

279-285.)
It is difficult to see what othfer "foundation" the
defendant expected.
Finally, even had some error occurred in the admission
of the blood sample and test result, such an admission would have
been harmless error.

The net effect of the blood testing was to

establish that the defendant had consumed a considerable amount
of alcohol before getting behind the wheel of his vehicle.

The

defendant and Rick Millen both established the same fact through
their testimony.

Even absent the blood knalysis testimony, the

evidence overwhelmingly supported the vepdict rendered.
POINT IV
THE EXPERT OPINION OF THE SPEEb OF THE
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED,
AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE DEFENDANT'S OWN
TESTIMONY.
The defendant claims that the trial court erred in
admitting the expert testimony of Highwa^ Patrol Officers
Ericksen and Dahle, that the speed of the defendant's vehicle
just prior to the collision was approximately 71 miles per hour.
It should first be noted that the defendant fails to
state how this testimony prejudiced him.

The defendant's own

testimony was that the last time he checked his speedometer he is
one hundred percent sure it said just under 55 miles per hour.
(T. 362)

This was just before he started downhill from the top

of the overpass.

(T. 363)

Shortly thereafter, and after

narrowly missing Pearce's vehicle when tie noticed Reid Neilson's
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headlights approaching, he stepped on the accelerator "all the
way to the floor,lf and then the crash occurred.

(T. 314, 369-70)

Thus, the fair inference from the defendant's own
testimony is that, his speed just prior to impact was apparently
something in excess of 55 miles per hour.

Beyond that fact, the

precise speed was not an important part of the evidence.
Excessive speed was not argued by the prosecutor as a factor
supporting the negligence element.

(T. 375-84, 397-401)

Trooper Ericksen was nevertheless properly qualified by
the trial court as an expert witness for purposes of giving an
opinion as to speed from a critical speed scuff and as to point
of impact of a collision.

The trial court was very meticulous

and thorough in requiring the state to establish sufficient
foundation as to Trooper Ericksen's qualifications as well as the
facts upon which he based his opinion.

Trooper Ericksen had

completed not only the basic accident investigation course given
to all traffic officers, but intermediate and advanced courses
as well, and had investigated approximately 75 accidents, about
10 of which involved the critical speed scuff.

(T. 173, 193)

Additionally, Trooper Ericksen's testimony was underscored by the
testimony of Highway Patrol Officer Robert Dahle, the instructor
of the accident investigation courses, a man of such extensive
training and experience that the defendant does not question his
qualifications as an expert. (T. 245-250)

All of Officer Dahle's

testimony was based on measurements already in evidence prior to
Officer Dahle taking the stand. (T. 198, 249)

18

The critical factor in determining whether an expert
should be qualified to testify as such, is simply whether, by way
of "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" (Rule
702), the person possesses specialized knowledge which will
assist the trier of fact in resolving trie issues of fact in the
case.

Wessel v. Ericksen Landscaping C6., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah

1985).

Furthermore, it is a longstanding holding of the Utah

Supreme Court that a considerable amount of discretion is granted
to the trial judge in passing on the qualifications of an expert
witness to testify on a particular subject matter. Wessel,
supra; Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co. Inc., ^98 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979);
Batt v. State, 503 P.2d 855 (Utah 1972).

And expert testimony

regarding the determination of a vehicle's speed by means of
markings on the roadway was specifically approved by the Utah
Supreme Court in Taylor v. Johnson, 414 P.2d 575 (1966).
Also in Taylor, as in the case at bar, precalculated
charts were also used by the expert in Calculating the speed of
the vehicle.

Rule 703 specifically allqws an expert witness to

rely on facts or data known to him and if they are lfof a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence" (emphasis added).

The

Utah Supreme Court approved such an apprtoach even before Rule 703
was adopted in Utah.

In State v. Claytqn, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah

1982), the Court stated:
The clear trend in the law of evidence is
toward the position expressed in the Federal
Rules with regard to the allowable base for
the testimony of experts. We find nothing to
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preclude the use of that standard in Utah...
once the expert is qualified by the court,
the witness may base his opinion on reports,
writings or observations not in evidence
which were made or compiled by others, so
long as they are of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in that particular field.
The opposing party may challenge the
suitability or reliability of such materials
on cross-examination, but such challenge goes
to the weight to be given the testimony, not
to its admissibility.
Trooper Ericksen was properly qualified as an expert for
the very limited aspects of accident reconstruction to which he
testified, and his testimony was based on his own personal
observations of the accident scene, the vehicles involved,
markings on the roadway, and measurements, and was clearly
admissible.
POINT V
THE DEFENDANT HAD COMPETENT, THOROUGH
REPRESENTATION BY VERY ABLE COUNSEL AND WAS
NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL.
The defendant next complains that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel, primarily because his attorney
didn't make enough objections. (Appellant's brief, p. 31)

The

standard of review applicable to this issue and cited by the
defendant is found in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah
1982).

The applicable principles stated by the Court in Malmrose

are:
1.

••[TJhe defendant bears the burden of establishing

ineffectiveness" of counsel.
2.

Id., at 58.

"The proof must be demonstrable, not speculative.11

Id.
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3.

•• [T]he courts will not second guess 'legitimate

exercise of judgment as to trial tactics or strategy.'••
4.

Id.

,f

[T]here is no prejudicial error warranting reversal

of the conviction unless better representation is likely to have
produced a different result."

Id.

During his testimony in the post-conviction hearing,
Wight v. Cook, the defendant's trial counsel explained the trial
strategy which he and the defendant took?
Q. You have heard Mr. Wight testify and I
think while you were out of thfe courtroom,
Mrs. Wight testified that they felt you were
not making enough objections during the
trial. Was anything ever brought to your
attention by either Mr. or Mrs. Wight that
there were things they wanted you to object
to that you were not objecting| to?
A. No. I explained that sometimes with
certain evidence, certain juries, that you
can appear obstreperous in trying to keep
them from hearing the whole truth, and so I
thought it was a wise move. s6 I explained
it to them and got their approval to the
phenomenon that I am going to make sure that
we keep out all objectional material, but we
are not going to object every time we have a
remote possibility of the Court sustaining.
And so as far as I was concerned, I objected
every time it was meaningful. There never
was a discussion of not objecting enough of
(sic) you are not doing it. (transcript in
the case of Wight v. Cook, p. 39)
In applying the principles of M^lmrose to the actual
performance of the defendant's trial coujnsel, the defendant has
fallen far short of establishing his burden of showing that
counsel was ineffective.

The defendant has not raised any

complaints of his counsel's decisions which did not involve a
very legitimate exercise of judgment on trial strateav. and
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certainly none of those decisions, if made differently# can be
said to have been likely to have produced a different result.
The defendant first claims counsel was constitutionally
inadequate for failing to object to the presence on the panel of
the juror who had had some acquaintance with the deceased's wife.
This argument must fail unless the defendant could show that 1) a
challenge for cause of that juror would have been sustained, if
made, and that 2) the decision by counsel not to object to that
juror's presence on the panel was not simply a matter of
strategy.

Neither is the case.

(See the discussion of this in

Point II above, and the transcript in the case of Wight v. Cook,
pp. 35-36, 48-50, 61-63)
The defendant's claim of prejudice due to trial
counsel's supposed failure to object to the blood sample and test
results must fail for the same reasons.
The defendant next attempts to take one single statement
of his trial counsel out of context to claim that counsel was
unprepared for the trial.

In discussing preliminary matters with

the Court in chambers, defense counsel asked about the Court's
procedure for posing questions to the jury venire.
asked counsel, "Do you have some?"

The Court

Counsel replied, "I haven't

had them written down because I have an incest case next week and
a rape case the next week and I have been going wild."

(T. 9.)

A similar statement could be made at the outset of a trial by any
attorney with a moderate practice at any given time.

To

transpose such a statement into a declaration of being
inadequately prepared for trial is ludicrous, particularly when
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the only result of counsel's busy schedule was that he didn't
reduce to writing his proposed questions to the jury venire.
Furthermore, a few moments later in open court, the
Court specifically asked defense counsel, "Mr. Walsh, are you
ready to proceed for the defendant?"
your Honor."

(T. 10.)

Cqunsel replied, lfWe are,

The thorough anq meticulous cross

examination of the State's witnesses thdt followed, as well as
objections and presentation of the defertse witnesses by defense
counsel, easily put to rest any questiori of counsel's being
unprepared.
Finally, the defendant attempts to criticize his trial
counsel for "allowing" the medical examiner to testify as to
facts not in evidence.
Again, this claim is not supported by the record.

The

prosecutor began supplying the witness with certain evidence
which had been given by other witnesses, at which time defense
counsel objected:
MR. WALSH: Your Honor, I am cooing to object
to this. It's one thing for Counsel to give
the expert witness hypothetical information
and it's another thing for him to comment on
what the evidence is and garnish the
evidence, if you will, by the process which
he is relaying information to the doctor.
THE COURT: I think I am going to sustain the
objection, but I think you are asking, I
assume, what is a hypothetical question, so
you have to assume it's hypothetical and make
suggestions rather than saying this is what
the evidence shows.
I
Q (By Mr. Harward):
following -

Assume, then the

MR. HARWARD: Your Honor, is ^he prior—must
I start over or can I take in what I have
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already asked and consider it part of an
assumption?
THE COURT:

That's right.
(T. 266).

The prosecutor then proceeded to state a hypothetical question to
the witness which was quite accurately in harmony with the
testimony of prior witnesses.
The fact of the matter is, defense counsel made a
proper objection to the prosecutor's question, which was
sustained; the prosecutor changed the form of his question to a
proper form, which was properly allowed by the Court.

Every

aspect of the prosecutor's hypothetical question was an accurate
recounting of facts already in evidence.
In short, the defendant is literally grasping at straws
in attempting to find fault with the manner in which he was
represented during the course of the trial.

His claim of

inadequate counsel is certainly not a meritorious issue for which
any relief should be granted.
Conclusion
The defendant has failed to state any claim for which
relief should be granted on appeal.

He was given a fair trial,

in the hands of an unbiased, properly selected jury of his peers;
he was represented by very able and conscientious defense
counsel of his own choosing; the verdict arrived at by the jury
was based on the evidence presented at trial, which evidence was
properly admitted and presented to the jury, and the jury's
verdict was just.
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The defendant's consumption of alcohol and his negligent
driving while under the influence of a great amount of alcohol
caused the death of an innocent man.

These facts were proved

beyond a reasonable doubt in a fair trial.

The defendant's

conviction and sentence should be affirmed, and his claims on
appeal denied.
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ADDENDUM
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
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Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.5 (1953, as amended)
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove
that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the
results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 416-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the
alleged driving or actual physical control the test result is
admissible as evidence of the person's bliod or breath alcohol
level at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control, but the trier of fact shall detepaine what weight is
given to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving
otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath
alcohol level or drug level at the time o£ the alleged operating
or actual physical control.

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.10(1)(a) and (3)
(1)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests
of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining
whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, or while under thi influence of alcohol,
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any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that
person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol,
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44.
*

*

*

(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any
chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the
consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may
be administered whether the person has beeh arrested or not.

Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-207
(1)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a felony of the
third degree, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while having
a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or while
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree which renders the
actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent11 means simple
negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which
reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar
circumstances.
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(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a felony of the
second degree, if the actor operates a mo^or vehicle while having
a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater! by weight, or while
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree which renders the
actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally
negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "qriminally negligent"
means criminal negligence as defined by subsection 76-2-103(4).
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by
Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5, apply to
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this
action.
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is
on or has been legally entitled to the alctohol or a drug is not a
defense to any charge of violating this section.
(6) Any chemical test is admissible in accordance with the Rules
of Evidence if administered on a defendant: (a) with his consent;
or (b) without his consent after his arrest either under this
section or under Section 41-6-44 where th$ officer has reason to
believe that the victim may die.
(7) For purposes of this section "motor vehicle" means any selfpropelled vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, any
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automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or
aircraft.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-24-9 (1953, as amended)
A witness must answer questions legal and bertinent to the matter
in issue, although his answer may establish a claim against
himself; but he need not give an answer which will have a
tendency to subject him to punishment for & felony; nor need he
give an answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade his
character, unless it is to the very fact ih issue or to a fact
from which the fact in issue would be presumed.

But a witness

must answer as to the fact of his previous! conviction of felony.

Rule 609(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Evidence
(a) General rule.
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
if elicited from him or established by public record during
cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence! outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2]I) involved dishonesty
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit.
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed pince the date of the

30

conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement
imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date unless
the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives
to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent
to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.

Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence
The facts or data in the particular case uion which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing.

If of a type reasonably

relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, tpe facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.
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